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RESUMEN 
Hacia 1914 existían notables diferencias económicas entre los países del 
Cono Sur y Cuba y el resto de América Latina. El artículo indaga las razones 
de estas diferencias, cuando aparecieron, así como la distancia existente entre 
los países latinoamericanos, los de la cuenca mediterránea y el líder industrial. 
Se ocupa de examinar el papel que desempeñaron las fuerzas demográficas, 
la localización geográfica y el grado de globalización e integración económica. 
El trabajo utiliza nuevos datos de salarios reales y precios relativos de los 
factores de siete países latinoamericanos y de tres regiones mediterráneas. 
Estos datos se comparan con la información disponible para Gran Bretaña 
y los Estados Unidos. 
ABSTRACT 
By 1914, there were huge economic gaps between the Soutbem Cone plus 
Cuba and the rest of Latin America. Can they be explained by the varying 
ability of these countries to exploit the first great globalization boom afier 
about 1870? Or did the gaps appear much earlier? And what about the gaps 
between Latin America and the Mediterranean, let alone with industrial leaders 
like Britain? What role did geographic isolation, globalization and demographic 
forces play in the process? Conventional GDP estimates are much too coarse 
to confront these questions. This essay uses a new data base on real wages 
and relative factor prices for seven Latin American and three Mediterranean 
regions, the latter being a source of so many of immigrants for the former. 
These ten regions, plus comparative information firom Britain and the United 
States, form the data base for the paper. 
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NEW DATA, OLD QUESTIONS 
Two important features of the world economy after 1950 also cha-
racteiized it before 1914. First, there was rapid globalization a century 
ago too: capital and labor flowed across national frontiers in unprecedented 
quantities, and at rising rates; and commodity trade boomed as transport 
costs dropped sharply. Second, the late 19th century underwent an impres-
sive convergence in living standards, at least within most of what we would 
now cali the OECD club, but what historians cali the Atlantic economy. 
Poor countries around the European periphery tended to grow faster than 
the rich industrial leaders at the European core, and often even faster 
than the richer countries overseas in the New World. This club excluded 
most of what is now called the Third World and eastern Europe, and 
even around this limited periphery there were some who failed to catch 
up. Nonetheless, there was convergence. 
It was not always that way: unambiguous divergence took place earlier. 
In the first half of the previous century, the Atlantic economy was cha-
racterized by high tariffs, modest commodity trade, no mass migrations, 
and an underdeveloped global capital market. Two profound shocks 
occurred in this environment still hostile to liberal globalization policy: early 
industrialization in Britain which then spread to a few countries on the 
European continent; and resource «discovery» in the New World, set in 
motion by sharply declining transport costs linking overseas suppliers to 
European markets, so much so that real freight rates fell by an enormous 
1.5 percent per annum between 1840 and 1910 (O'Rourke and Williamson 
1998). These two shocks triggered a divergence in real wages and living 
standards across the Atlantic economy that lasted until the middle of the 
century (Williamson 1996) '. 
Figure 1 shows that the Atlantic economy convergence which started 
in mid-century continued up to 1914: a plot of the dispersión of real wages 
is given there, documenting what the modem macro economists cali sig-
ma-convergence. The line with the diamonds on the upper left of Figure 
1 is based on a 13-country Atlantic economy sample including Australia, 
' Prasannan Parthasarathi (1998) also uses this dating to describe lagging India, and 
so does Kenneth Pomeranz (1997) for lagging China. In contrast, Robert Alien (1998) argües 
that the divergence within Europe started long before the industrial revolution. Elsewhere, 
I explore these competing views with real wage evidence from the Mediterranean (Williamson 
1998b; 1999b forthcoming) and Asia (Williamson 1998a; 1999a forthcoming), data much 
like that presented here for Latin America. 
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FIGURE 1 
International Real Wage Dispersión: The Atlantic Economy 1854-1913 
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SOURCE: Williamson (1995, Table A2.1; revised in O'Rourke and Wüliamson, 1997). 
Belgium, Brazil, France, Germany, Great Britain, Ireland, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United States. The dashed line 
in Figure 1 documents convergence for an expanded 17-country Atlantic 
economy sample, now including in addition Argentina, Canadá, Denmark 
and Italy. This measure shows the convergence tide ebbing around 1900. 
If we exelude Ganada and the United States, two «exceptional» rich coun-
tries which bucked the convergence tide, convergence continúes rapidly 
up to 1914 (the 15-country sample plotted with the triangles). If we exelude 
in addition two Mediterranean Basin countries which failed to play the 
globalization game, Portugal and Spain, convergence up to 1914 is faster 
still (the 13-country sample plotted with the squares). 
Meanwhile, how did Latin America do? Based on macro data reviewed 
by John Coatsworth (1993), it is very diffícult to tell. Coatsworth thinks 
that there was no growth in GDP per capita at all in any of the colonial 
economies between 1700 and 1820. Since there was hardly muchper capita 
income growth in Europe either during that century, one might conclude 
that Latin America maintained its relative position vis a vis Europe, and 
that the economic gaps between regions within Latin America changed 
but litde. The half century between 1820 and 1870 was one of revolution, 
civil war and early independence. Like África today, Latin America was 
103 
JEFFREY G. WILLIAMSON 
an economic and political basket case. Angus Maddison (1995) offers GDP 
per capita growth evidence for Brazil and México onJy, and they both do 
very badly, Brazil growing by only 10 percent over the five decades as 
a whole and México declining by 7 percent. Coatsworth guesses that Colom-
bia underwent no growth over the period. This evidence certainly confirms 
that Latin America must have lost a lot in the race with the United States 
and Britain, since those two leaders registered GDP per capita growth rates 
of about 1 percent per annum up to 1870. The evidence says very litde, 
however, about growing or contracting gaps between regions within Latin 
America. Latin American economic performance is better documented bet-
ween mid-century and the Great War in Europe (Maddison 1995; Enger-
man and Sokoloff 1996), and the period offers two notable facts. First, 
the poorest Latin American countries were growing slowest, illustrated by 
Brazil and Perú, while the richest Latin American countries were growing 
fastest, illustrated by Argentina, Chile and México. This limited evidence 
certainly seems to point to economic divergence within the región. Second, 
the región as a whole seemed to be holding its own relative to Europe. 
Indeed, the fast growing richer regions were actually catching up. We would 
like to be more precise, however. Exactly when and where did the catching 
up and falling behind take place? We need to know the answers if the 
correlates of economic success and failure in Latin America are to be iden-
tified. This macro data just reviewed will not provide the necessary evidence 
since it is available only for benchmark years separated by decades, and 
important regions like Cuba and Colombia are excluded. 
In any case, and as I shall stress below, GDP per capita and real wages 
would have grown at the same rate only under unusual conditions, con-
ditions that were very unlikely to have been satisfied prior to 1940. So, 
what happened to real wages and living standards when Latin America 
responded to the challenge of both the European Industrial Revolution 
and the first great globalization boom? And what happened to both real 
wages and GDP per capita during war, interwar and autarky after 1913 
when extemal economic policy underwent such spectacular change? 
These are the questions that motívate this essay. They are in the tra-
dition of W. Arthur Lewis who was the first to ask whether the core pulled 
along the periphery during this first great globalization boom (Lewis 1969, 
1978a, 1978b). It was he, togedier with Alexander Gerschenkron (1952), 
who first tried to break the economic historian's tenacious fíxation on the 
industrial leaders, Lewis focusing on the Third World and Gerschenkron 
on European late comers like Italy and eastem Europe. Thus, these ques-
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tions are not new to Latin American economic history, but they could 
not be attacked very well even only a decade ago since the data had not 
been gathered in such a way as to make these comparative judgments 
possible. Now we have enough to make some real progress. 
OVERTHROWING THE TYRANNY OF DISTANCE IN LATÍN 
AMERICA AND THE GREAT TERMS OF TRADE DEBATE 
In a book entitled The Tyranny of Distance, Geoffrey Blainey showed 
how distance shaped Australian history. Distance had the same impact 
on the rest of Asia until late in the 19th century, isolating Asia from Europe 
where, after all, the industrial revolution was unfolding. Late in the 19th 
century, transport innovations started to change all that, although not com-
pletely. The appearance of the Suez Canal, cost-reducing innovations on 
sea-going transport, and railroads penetrating the interior may not have 
completely liberated Asia from the tyranny of distance by 1914, but it 
certainly helped enormously. 
Why shouldn't this account about economic isolation apply to Latin 
America as well? It is certainly consistent with the «new economic geo-
graphy» (Krugman 1991a, 1991b). After all, the economic distance to the 
European core varied considerably depending on location in Latin America. 
The Panamá Canal was not completed until 1914, and before then the 
Andean economies —Perú and Ecuador— must have been very seriously 
disadvantaged in European trade. And prior to the introduction of a railroad 
network, which didn't really start until the 1870s, the landlocked countries 
of Bolivia and Paraguay were at an even more serious disadvantage. This 
was also true of the Mexican interior (Coatsworth 1981), the Colombian 
interior, and the Argentine interior (Newland 1998). A cióse observer of 
early 19th century Latin America, Belford Hinton Wilson, reported in 1842 
the cost of moving a ton of goods from England to the following capital 
cities (in pounds sterling): Buenos Aires and Montevideo 2; Lima 5.12; 
Santiago 6.58; Caracas 7.76; México City 17.9; Quito 21.3; Sucre or Chu-
quisca, 25.56; and Bogotá 52.9. The variance is huge, with the costs to 
Equador (Quito), Bolivia (Sucre or Chuquisca), New Granada (e.g., 
Colombia, Bogotá), and México nine to twenty-seven times that of Buenos 
Aires and Montevideo, both well placed on either side of the Rio de la 
Plata (Brading 1969). 
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Geographic isolation helps explain much of the economic ranking of 
nations in 1870, with poor countries most isolated: Argentina and Uruguay 
at the top; Cuba and México next; Columbia and southeast Brazil third; 
and Perú, Ecuador, Bolivia and Paraguay at the bottom. Of course, there 
were other factors at work like slavery and bad luck in world commodity 
markets (e.g, the Brazilian Northeast). Furthermore, geographic isolation 
helps explain much of the subsequent poor growth performance in these 
mostly poor parts of Latin America after 1870. Even after the late 19th 
century railroad boom, much of the Latin American interior was still iso-
lated: for example, railway track per 1,000 population in Bolivia, Ecuador, 
Paraguay and Perú was still only about a tenth that of Australia, New 
Zealand and Canadá in 1912 (Bulmer-Thomas 1994). Furthermore, the 
tyranny of distance did not disappear as a development obstacle in these 
poor and initially-isolated parts of Latin America even after 1950. Indeed, 
economists have shown that poor growth performance today is still asso-
ciated with whether a country is landlocked, whether the length of its coast-
line is limited, and whether its distance from Tokyo, New York or Rot-
terdam is long (Radelet, Sachs and Lee 1997). Bolivia, Ecuador, Paraguay, 
Perú, the Argentine interior and the Mexican interior all face a trade disad-
vantage, and if trade matters to growth, those regions face a growth disad-
vantage as well. 
In contrast, the Latin American regions bordering on the Atlantic, with 
long coastlines and with good navigable river systems, have always been 
favored by a trade advantage and thus a growth advantage as well. These 
include Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela, Central America, Cuba and the other 
Caribbean islands. Of course, these regions may have failed for other rea-
sons, but geographic isolation certainly wasn't one of them. 
Transport cost declines from interior to port, and from port to Europe 
or to the East and Gulf Coast of the United States, ensured that Latin 
American economies became more integrated into world markets after 
around 1850. Price gaps between Britain and both Americas were driven 
down and trade stimulated as a consequence. True, transport costs and 
price differentials involving trade between Europe and North America aré 
far better documented than are those between Europe and South America. 
Yet, the qualitative literature suggests that the same was happening south 
of the US border. 
Prior to the railway era, transportation was either by road or water, 
with water being the cheaper option by far. Thus, investment in river and 
harbor improvements increased briskly everywhere in the Atlantic economy. 
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Steamships were the most important 19th century contribution to shipping 
technology. The Claremont made its debut on the Hudson in 1807; a stea-
mer had made the journey up the Mississippi as far as Louisville by 1815; 
British steamers had traveled up the Seine to París by 1816. In the first 
half of the century, steamships were mainly used on important rivers, the 
Great Lakes, and inland seas such as the Baltic and the Mediterranean. 
A regular trans-Atlantic steam service was inaugurated in 1838, but until 
1860 steamers mainly carried high-value goods similar to those carried by 
airplanes today, Hke passengers, mail and gourmet food. 
The switch from sail to steam may have been gradual, but it accounted 
for a steady decline in transport costs across the Atlantic (Harley 1988). 
A series of innovations in subsequent decades helped make steamships 
more efficient: the screw propeUer, the compound engine, steel hulls, bigger 
size and shorter tum-around time in port. Before 1869, steam tonnage 
had never exceeded sail tonnage in British shipyards; in 1870, steam ton-
nage was over twice as great as sail, and sail tonnage only exceeded steam 
in two years after that date (Fletcher 1958). 
Refrigeration was another technological innovation with major trade 
implications. Mechanical refrigeration was developed between 1834 and 
1861, and by 1870 chilled beef was being transported from the United 
States to Europe (Mokyr 1990). In 1876, the first refrigerated ship, the 
Frigorifique, sailed from Argentina to France carrying frozen beef. By the 
1880s, South American meat was being exported in large quantities to 
Europe. Not only did railways and steamships mean that European farmers 
were faced with overseas competition in the grain market, but refrigeration 
also deprived them of the natural protection distance had always provided 
local meat and dairy producers. The consequences for European farmers 
of this overseas competition would be profound (O'Rourke 1997; O'Rourke 
and Williamson 1999). 
What was the impact of these transport innovations on the cost of 
moving goods between markets? Certainly trade boomed in Latin America. 
While the estimates offered by Victor Bulmer-Thomas (1994) may be rough, 
they certainly prove the point. The share of Latin American exports in 
GDP was around 10 percent in 1850, while in 1912 it was 25 percent. 
But when economists look at this period, they tend to ignore the fact 
that the decline in transatlantic transport costs after mid century was enor-
mous, and focus instead only on trade. This is a mistake. The volume 
of trade is not by itself a satisfactory index of commodity market integration. 
It is the cost of moving goods between markets that counts. The cost 
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has two parts, that due to transpon and that due to trade barriers (such 
as tariffs). The price spread between markets is driven by changes in these 
costs, and diey need not move in the same direction. It tums out that 
tariffs in the Atlantic economy did not fall from the 1870s to World War 
I; the globalization which took place in the late 19th century cannot be 
assigned to more liberal trade policy. Instead, it was falling transport costs 
which provoked globalization. Indeed, rising tariffs were mainly a defensive 
response to the competitive winds of market integration as transport costs 
declined (O'Rourke and Williamson 1998). 
This is an important point that somehow has disappeared from the 
collective memory of the economics profession: while the late 19* century 
Atlantic economy was certainly more «liberal» than between 1914 and 1950, 
it was also a period oiretreat from opeimess. Yet, the decline in International 
transport costs overwhelmed the retreat from free trade, thus implying 
commodity price convergence between center and periphery. The impact 
of these productivity improvements on transport costs around the Atlantic 
economy can be seen graphically in Figure 2. What is labeled the North 
Índex (North 1958) accelerates its fall after the 1830s, and what is labeled 
the British index (Harley 1988) is fairly stable up to mid century before 
undergoing the same, big fall. The North freight rate index among American 
export routes dropped by more than 41 percent in real terms between 
1870 and 1910. The British index fell by about 70 percent, again in real 
terms, between 1840 and 1910. These two Índices imply a steady decline 
in Atlantic economy transport costs of about 1.5 percent per annum, for 
a total of 45 percentage points up to 1913, a big number indeed. There 
is another way to get a comparative feel for the magnitude of this decline. 
The World Bank reports that tariffs on manufactures entering developed 
country markets fell from 40 percent in the late 1940s to 7 percent in 
the late 1970s, a 33 percentage point decline over thirty years (Wood 1994). 
While impressive, this spectacular postwar reclamation of «free trade» from 
interwar autarky is still smaller than the 45 percentage point fall in trade 
barriers between 1870 and 1913 due to transport improvements. 
Declining transport costs produced profound commodity price con-
vergence between Latin America and Europe, at least if they behaved anyt-
hing like Anglo-American price differentials. Liverpool wheat prices excee-
ded Chicago wheat prices by 58 percent in 1870, by 18 percent in 1895, 
and by 16 percent in 1912 .^ Moreover, these estimates understate the size 
^ The remainder of this paragraph draws its evidence from O'Rourke and Williamson 
(1994). 
108 
REAL WAGES, INEQUALITY AND GLOBAUZATION IN LATÍN AMERICA BEFORE 1940 
FIGURE 2 
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SouRCE: Harley (1988, Figure 1), deflated by UK GNP deflator, ratio scale. 
of the price convergence because they ignore the collapse in price gaps 
between farm and interior railhead. Was the experience in Anglo-American 
wheat markets repeated for other foodstuffs? The second biggest tradable 
foodstuff consisted of meat and animal fats such as beef, pork, mutton 
and butter. Based on London-Cincinnati price differentials for bacon, there 
was no convergence across the 1870s and 1880s, but the price convergence 
after 1895 was even more dramatic for meat than it was for wheat: price 
gaps were 93 percent in 1870, 92 percent in 1895, and 18 percent in 
1913. The delay in price convergence for meat has an easy explanation: 
it required the advances in refrigeration made towards the end of the cen-
tury. Anglo-American price data are also available for many other non-a-
gricultural commodities. The Boston-Manchester cotton textile price gap, 
which had been 14 percent in 1870, completely vanished by 1913; the 
Philadelphia-London iron bar price gap fell from 75 to 21 percent, while 
the pig iron price gap fell from 85 to 19 percent, and the copper price 
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gap fell from 33 percent to almost zero. More relevant to Argentina and 
Uruguay, the Boston-London hides price gap fell from 28 to 9 percent, 
while the wool price gap fell from 59 to 28 percent. 
The decline in transport costs created commodity price convergence 
in the Atlantic economy up to the Great War, and most of Latin America 
was part of it. Trade boomed. Of course, we would like to know more 
about where the commodity price convergence forces were greatest. Did 
the tyranny of distance suffer a bigger defeat in the more isolated parts 
of Latin America or the less isolated parts? Did the poorer regjons gain 
less than the richer ones? Furthermore, note that this stress on the decline 
in transportation costs between center and periphery ties in closely to a 
very important but historically very badly informed debate over the relative 
price of primary products. The so-called «terms of trade debate» has its 
origin in the coUapse of primary product prices during the great depression, 
but Gunnar Myrdal, Ragnar Nurkse, Raúl Prebisch and Hans Singer argued 
in the 1950s and 1960s that the downward trend was secular (Diakosawas 
and Scandizzo 1991: 238-239). This interpretation served to fuel the policy 
move towards Third World autarky in the 1950s and 1960s. However, 
what these four intellectual giants failed to appreciate is that during trans-
port revolutions —like that from the mid-19th century to World War I— 
the terms of trade can (and did) rise for both center and periphery (Ells-
worth 1956; Bairoch 1975). It was not a zero-sum game. With Latin Ame-
rican globalization forces now on the table, let us turn now to growth 
in the región. 
THE GROWTH OF WHAT? 
Most economists who have written about the comparative growth of 
nations have used GDP per capüa or per worker to measure catching up 
and convergence, or falling behind and divergence. This and other essays 
of mine favor instead real wage rates (purchasing-power-parity adjusted, 
and typically for urban unskilled workers) and other factor prices (like 
land rents and skill premia). I can think of at least four good reasons 
why it is a mistake for the convergence debate to have ignored wages 
and other factor prices, especially for the previous century and earlier. 
First, the pre-1940 real wage data —certainly for Latin America— are 
of far better quality than the GDP per capita data, and they are certainly 
available for a wider sample. Indeed, Angus Maddison (1995) is able to 
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document real GT)P per capüa for a surprisingly small part of 19th century 
Latín America: for 1820, he gives estímales of GDP per capita only for 
Brazil and México, two countries which based on 1900 populatíon weights 
would have accounted for only 53 percent of Latin America; a half century 
later, he offers estimates for one more, Argentína, raising the share of 
Latín America covered to 61 percent (again, based on 1900 population); 
thirty years later, he offers estimates for four more, but there are still many 
missing. It seems to me that the available GDP per capita data are not 
sufficient by themselves to deal adequately with the questions raised thus 
far in this essay. As the background paper for this essay shows (Williamson 
1998c), real wages can be documented for the following (so far): Argentina 
from 1864; Southeast Brazil from 1830; Northeast Brazil from 1855; Colom-
bia from 1863; Cuba from 1905; México from 1877; and Uruguay fixjm 
1870 (augmented by Bertola et al. 1999). Furthermore, we can begin making 
statements about purchasing-power-parity (PPP) adjusted real wages relative 
to the European core from each of those dates. In addition, these real wage 
time series are typically available annually, so that epochs and major tuming 
points can be identified with much greater clarity than is true of the GDP 
data which are typically reported for every two decades or even longer. 
Second, income distribution matters, and wage rates (especially when 
combined with other factor pnces) offer a window through which to look 
in on distribution issues. Real people earn wages or skill premia or profits 
or rents, not that statistical artifact known as GDP per capita. GDP per 
worker hour may sound like a good measure of aggregate productivity, 
but surely the living standards of ordinary workers as captured by real 
wages are a better indicator of the economic well-being of the vast majority 
in any society. By averaging all incomes, macro economists (and economic 
historians that mimic them) throw away valuable information. 
Third, factor price movements help us understand the growth of nations. 
For example, productivity catch-up in Latin America was more likely to 
increase all factor pnces equally than was mass immigration (increasing 
population pressure on the land) or an export boom for agricultural pro-
ducís (increasing the demand for immobile land more than mobile labor). 
The open economy forces which may have been important in driving late 
19th century economic change in Latin America —trade, migration and 
capital flows— operated direcdy on factor prices, and thus only indirectly 
on GDP per capita ^. An exclusive focus on GDP per capita misses most 
of the story. 
For a summary, see Williamson (1996) and O'Rourke and Williamson (1999). 
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Fourth, economic change nearly always involves winners and losers, 
a fact which is crucial in accounting for the evolution of policy, perhaps 
more so in politically independent Latín American societies than in depen-
dent colonial societíes in Asia and África. Indeed, distributíonal effects 
may even influence the survival of newly independent countries. Changes 
that would increase GDP per capita but would also cause losses to some 
politically powerful group are often successfully resisted, and examining 
the behavior of factor prices is a good way to start the search for the 
sources of such political resistance. 
THE LATÍN AMERICAN REAL WAGE HIERARCHY AROUND 
THE TURN OF THE CENTURY 
Table 1 pulís together estimates of the real wage hierarchy around Latin 
America and between it and the European industrial leader, Britain. The 
assessment is made around the tum of the century. All of the estimates 
in Table 1 calcúlate urban unskilled wages from various parts of Latin 
America relative to urban unskilled wages in Britain''. More importantly, 
none of the wage relatives in Table 1 are calculated at the prevailing exchan-
ge rate. It is well-known that the use of exchange rates, dominated by 
tradable goods, is inferior to the use of purchasing-power-parity, the latter 
constructed from workers' market baskets. However, trying to construct 
PPP-adjusted real wages based on common market baskets and region-spe-
cifíc relative prices would entail another research project. Table 1 uses 
a shortcut: we take the 1910 PPP-adjusted GDV per capita estimates repor-
ted recently by Pablo Astorga and Valpy FitzGerald (1998) as our bench-
mark and project our real wage series forward and backward from that 
point. To make the comparison with Britain, I use the 1910 PPP-adjusted 
urban unskilled real wages in Argentina and Britain reported in my previous 
work (Williamson 1995), and then adjust the remaining Latin American 
countries accordingly, a procedure which assumes that the cardinal ranking 
'' True, one of these regions, Northeast Brazil (Pemambuco), reports farm wages, not 
urban unskilled wages. But even in this case, if the wage gap between city and countryside 
was relatively stable over time then the Northeast Brazil time series would be an adequate 
proxy for changes in the real wages of urban workers. I have not been able to find the 
evidence for the Brazilian Northeast to confirm or deny this assumption. 
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TABLEl 
The Latín American Real Wage Hierarchy Near the Tum ofthe Century 
Real Wage Relative to Great Britain 
Región (in percent) 
1873-188} 1899-1903 1909-1913 
Argentina 74.2 100.9 97.9 
Brazil, Southeast 18.8 18.3 22.0 
BrazÜ, Northeast 5.2 5.0 7.7 
Colombia 17.3 26.2*** 24.5 
Cuba 73.9 
México 67.3* 58.2 65.3 
Uruguay 97.0** 82£ 97.4 
SouRCES AND NOTES: The Latín American data are from WílÜamson (1998c), Appendix 
Tables 1-6, PPP-adjusted with Great Britain in 1913 = 100. The British data is taken from 
my revised Atlantic economy data base (Williamson 1995; revised in O'Rourke and WU-
liamson 1997), 
* As the México real wage series starts only in 1877, this entry reports an average 
for 1877-1883, 
** As the Uruguay real wage series starts only in 1880, this entry reports an average 
for 1880-1883. 
*** As the Colombia real wage series exeludes the years 1901-1908 because of hyper-
inflation in the country, this entry reports an average for 1899-1900. 
of the Latin American countries relative to Argentina would be the same 
in 1910 for real unskilled urban wages and GDP per capüa ' . 
The Latin American real wage hierarchy around the tum of century 
is clear enough, and while some of the estimates in Table 1 seem to be 
consistent with other qualitative and quantitative accounts, some are quite 
surprising. 
The Brazilian Northeast was at the bottom of the hierarchy, with wor-
kers' living standards only 5-8 percent of those in Britain. Conditions were 
dismal in this región which had only recently freed these workers from 
slavery and which had been beset with sagging prices of their key expor-
tables (Leff 1972), but it is hard to imagine living standards being much 
worse. Perhaps they are understated. While the Brazilian Northeast and 
These PPP-adjustments are being revised, based on new research for both Argentina 
and Uruguay by Luis Bértola. These adjustments —as well as new time series for México 
and Uruguay— will be used to make forther revisions in the data base used in this essay. 
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the Italian Mezzogiorno have always been cited as classic examples of regio-
nal «dualism» (Williamson 1965), wages in Brazil's poor Northeast were 
well below Italy's poor Mezzogiorno just prior to World War I, the former 
less than a third of the latter (Williamson 1998b). Even unskilled cons-
truction workers in Egypt had real wages almost double those in Northeast 
Brazil. Furthermore, none of the unskilled workers in Asian cities and towns 
had real wages that low: they were more than double that in Burma and 
India (Williamson 1998a). AU of this suggests, incidentally, that the living 
standard gaps between regions in Latin America around World War I were 
far bigger than they were in either the Mediterranean or Asia. 
Argentina and Uruguay were, of course, at the top of the heap, fre-
quently switching the leadership position between the 1870s and 1910, 
but ending up about on par just prior to the Great War in Europe. México 
and Cuba were next in line, two-thirds to three-quarters of the Southern 
Cone. Nowhere in Asia did real wages come cióse to those in México 
and Cuba: the three most labor-scarce Asian countries in 1909-13 —Japan, 
Korea and the Philippines— had real wages less than half those of Cuba 
and México. From there, it was a big step down to the real wages and 
living standards prevailing for the unskilled in Colombia (Bogotá) and the 
Brazilian Southeast (Rio de Janeiro). 
REAL WAGE GAPS WITHIN LATÍN AMERICA: 
CONVERGENCE OR DIVERGENCE? 
Table 1 suggests two additional facts worth noting. It is certainly true 
that the real wage estimates for 1909-1913 offer strong confírmation of 
the historical persistence of the wealth of nations. That is, the Latin Ame-
rican economic hierarchy changed very little in the eighty years after 
1909-1913, at least as gauged by the five in Table 1 whose GDPper capita 
Astorga and FitzGerald (1998) can document between 1910 and 1990; 
only Brazil and Cuba switched their positions in the hierarchy during the 
20th century. It appears that history and initial conditions have mattered 
a great deal to Latin America in this century. However, the size of the 
gaps between these parts of Latin America diminished dramatically. In 
1910, the five poorest countries whose GDPp^r capita can be documented 
were Brazil, Ecuador, Venezuela, Colombia and Perú, from poorest on 
up. Setting the average of the three richest countries —^Argentina, Chile 
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and Cuba— at 100, the five poorest had per capita incomes of 18.8, 25, 
26.3, 33.4 and 34.3. In 1990, the same calculation, and in the same order, 
yields relativepéT capita incomes of 80.7, 53.2, 127.7, 76.7 and 50.9. Every 
single one of these five Latin American countries who were poorest eighty 
years ago began catching up with the richest three Latin American countries 
thereafter, and the collapse in the gap between the richest and poorest 
countries was quite significant. 
FIGURE 3 
Dispersión o/GDPper capita in Latin America 1900-1995 
Year 
So far, the evidence points to strong economic convergence within Latin 
America in the 20th century. What happens if México is added to the 
list (giving us nine observations) and a measure of dispersión, C(9), is 
calculated for every census date from 1910 to the present? The results 
are plotted in Figure 3 and they confírm the cruder measures of con-
vergence offered in the previous paragraph. Between 1910 and 1930, the 
dispersión index drops by more than a half, from about 0.40 to 0.19, a 
nuge decline. The decline ceases between 1930 and 1970, after which it 
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FIGURE 4 
Real Wages in Latín America (1913 = 100): Argentína, Southeast Brazil 
and Uruguay 
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FIGURE 5 
Real Wages in Latín America (1913 = 100): Northeast Brazil, Columbia, 
Cuba and México 
Year 
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drops sharply again, to about 0.09 in 1990. Why did this 20th century 
convergence within Latin America take place in two steps, and why during 
those epochs? 
FIGURE 6 
Dispersión of PPP-Adjusted Real Wages in Latin America 1864-1914 
i 
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So much for this century; what about the last? Was there convergence 
within Latin America in the 19th century as well? ^ Here we use our real 
wage data, which are plotted in Figures 4 and 5. True, the total number 
of countries in the 19th century sample is smaller, and there are missing 
years in some of the time series. While the data are imperfect, Figure 6 
patches together overlapping measures of C as best we can. The imperfect 
data seem to offer an unambiguous answer to the question at hand. There 
is some convergence between the mid-1890s and World War I suggested 
by C(5), so the 20th century convergence we see in Figure 3 may have 
had it's source in the very late 19th century. But there is absolutely no 
evidence of convergence in Latin America prior to the tum of the century. 
I continué to underÜne «within» to alert the reader that I am not yet talking about 
gaps between Latin America and the core. 
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TABLE2 
Real Wage Performance in Latín America, 1830-1939 
(1913 = 100) 







1855-1859 45.1 40.0 
1860-1864 53.3 73.2 
1865-1869 55.6 50.4 74.2 100.8 
1870-1874 61.4 53.0 63.8 83.2 
1875-1879 54.3 65.3 62.7 70.8 
1880-1884 69.0 73.2 57.7 84.0 70.2 88.5 
1885-1889 82.8 84.0 53.2 119.7 69.9 115.6 
1890-1894 90.8 71.6 49.0 133.7 72.3 135.0 
1895-1899 97.7 72.9 54.6 155.5 79.1 113.7 
1900-1904 111.3 94.0 86.6 — 80.1 104.5 
1905-1909 98.4 103.4 112.1 — 107.4 82.0 103.0 
1910-1914 101.8 102.2 110.2 130.0 99.5 76.8 105.2 
1915-1919 76.1 76.6 70.6 158.9 92.4 30.7 73.9 
1920-1924 110.6 68.4 58.9 194.2 117.5 38.5 110.9 
1925-1929 135.9 80.9 60.4 252.9 136.0 49.9 128.6 
1930-1934 139.3 97.1 44.9 375.4 141.1 60.7 145.4 
1935-1939 138.6 302.4 135.0 48.6 137.4 
SouRCES: Williamson (1998c), Appendix Tables 1-6. 
Indeed, C(4) and C(6) suggest divergence up to the 1890s, not convergence. 
Paul Krugman and Anthony Venables (1990,1995) might view this inverted 
U-shaped pattern in Latin American real wage dispersión as support for 
their position that globalization is likely to cause divergence in early stages 
of development before it causes convergence in later stages. However, 
industrialization is central to the Krugman-Venables model and it is not 
clear that it was the central forcé accounting for divergence in 19th century 
Latin America. Perhaps instead it might be that the richer parts of Latin 
America, which had closer commercial ties with North America and Europe, 
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TABLE3 
Real Wage in Latin America Relative to Great Britain, 1830-1939 
{in percent) 







1855-1859 16.8 4.4 
1860-1864 20.4 8.3 
1865-1869 81.8 17.2 7.6 28.6 
1870-1874 86.5 17.3 6.2 22.6 
1875-1879 65.8 18.2 5.2 16.3 
1880-1884 81.2 19.9 4.7 19.0 66.5 95.4 
1885-1889 85.3 20.0 3.8 23.8 58.1 109.2 
1890-1894 87.8 16.1 3.3 25.0 56.4 119.2 
1895-1899 85.9 14.8 3.3 26.3 56.0 91.8 
1900-1904 101.0 19.7 5.4 — 58.4 86.8 
1905-1909 92.0 22.3 7.2 — 76.2 61.7 88.2 
1910-1914 100.8 23.4 7.4 24.8 74.8 60.6 95.2 
1915-1919 91.1 21.5 5.8 36.9 84.3 30.0 81.0 
1920-1924 103.9 14.8 3.8 35.0 84.0 29.1 95.3 
1925-1929 125.5 17.2 3.8 44.9 95.3 37.0 108.7 
1930-1934 116.6 18.8 2.6 60.5 89.9 40.7 111.4 
1935-1939 115.2 48.4 85.1 32.4 104.4 
SouRCES AND NoTES: See notes to Table 1. 
were also favored by bigger improvements in transpon connections between 
them and the core. I leave this question on the agenda for future research. 
REAL WAGE GAPS BETWEEN CORE AND PERIPHERY: 
CONVERGENCE OR DIVERGENCE DURING THE FIRST GREAT 
GLOBALIZATION BOOM? 
In spite of convergence within Latin America between 1910 and 1995, 
there was divergence between Latin America and the world leaders. All 
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TABLE4 
Real Wage Performance in Latín America by Decades Relative to Great Britain, 
and the Mediterranean Basin, 1830s-1939s 
Period Argentina Brazil, Brazil, Colombia Cuba México Uruguay 
Southeast Northeast 
A. Relative to Great Britain 
1830s 14.5 
1850s 16.5 
1870s 76.2 17.7 5.7 19.5 
1890s 86.8 15.5 3.3 25.7 56.2 105.5 
1909-1913 97.9 22.0 7.7 24.5 73.9 65.3 97.4 
1930s 115.9 54.4 87.5 36.6 107.9 
B Relative to Weighted Average of Italy, Portugal, and Spain 
1830s 30.5 
1850S 35.8 
1870s 207.7 48.9 15.5 53.1 
1890s 267.8 47.5 10.1 79.1 173.2 324.8 
1909-1913 212.1 47.8 16.8 53.1 160.5 140.9 211.5 
1930s 201.1 94.4 152.2 63.0 187.0 
C Per Annum Growth Rate (%) 
1830s-1850s 1.27 
1850s-1870s 1.50 
1870s-1890s 3.15 1.11 -0.90 4.39 
1890S-1909/13.. 0.46 2.24 7.58 -0.55 0.67 -0.69 
1909/13-1930S.. 1.58 6.72 1.56 -1.49 1.20 
SouRCES AND NOTES: For panel A, see notes to Table 1. For panel B, see Williamson 
(1998c), Appendix Table 7.4 for PPP-adjusted Latín American real wages where emigrating 
Mediterranean countries in 1913 = 100. ITie real wage series for the emigrating Mediter-
ranean countries (Italy, Portugal, and Spain) is a weighted average of the respective real 
wage Índices of these three countries, where the weights used were the 1913 populations 
of these countries found in Maddison 1995. For more details, see the text preceding Appendix 
Table 7.4. Panel C is based on the real wage data in Williamson (1998c), Appendix Tables 1-6. 
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six parts of Latin America documented in Table 1 for 1909-13 lost ground 
relative to Britain in this century ^, some of them a great deal of ground. 
But what about prior to the Great War? Was the 19th century different? 
FIGURE 7 
Real Wages in Latin America relative to Great Britain (in percent) 












- • - Argentina 
SE Brazil 
- * - Uruguay 
ol 
O O C O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O C O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O \ O ^ O ^ O ^ C ^ O ^ O ^ O ^ O ^ O ^ O ^ O ^ O ^ 
Year 
Table 3, Table 4 and Figure 7 all document that Argentina was catching 
up with Britain in the half-century before World War I. There is evidence 
that the Brazilian Southeast started catching up from mid-century. But 
catch up with the European leaders doesn't seem to have been taken place 
anywhere else in Latin America (see also Figure 8). Table 3 shows clearly 
that Colombia, México and Uruguay were able to hold their own up to 
the Great War, but real wages there do not show catching up with those 
in Britain. Ñor is there any evidence of catching up in the Brazilian Nort-
heast or in Cuba. 
' Since rich countries are supposed to grow more slowly than poor ones, United States 
growth experience up to 1940 must be viewed as unusually fast —bucking the convergence 
tide (WiUiamson 1995). Thus, it makes far more sense to compare the Latin America 
periphery with the European core, like Britain. 
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FIGURE 8 
Real Wages in Latín America relative to Great Britain (in percent) 
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While there is very little evidence of Latin American catch up on the 
world's leaders prior to 1914, at least Latín America was able to hold 
its own. In contrast, there is plenty of evidence of fall back in the 20th 
century. Why the difference between the two centuries? What were the 
economic and demographic fundamentáis present during the first great 
globalization boom which were absent thereafter? The literature points, 
of course, to policy in accounting for the great divide. Relative to the 
world leaders, better growth performance in Latin America prior to the 
1920s then afterwards seems to be highly correlated with an open policy 
on one side of that divide and a closed policy on the other. But any agenda 
whose goal is to isolate the role of policy in accounting for the different 
growth experience on either side of 1914 needs to control for everything 
else that might matter, especially those factors that must have influenced 
policy —demography, bad luck in world factor markets, bad luck in world 
commodity markets, the tyranny of distance and other forces. 
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REAL WAGE GAPS AND MIGRAHON BETWEEN 
THE OLD AND NEW WORLD 
The fact that Italian, Portuguese and Spanish emigrants were poor by 
western European standards, and that so many went to Latin America, 
has generated debate on the receiving end. Sir Arthur Lewis thought that 
his model of development (Lewis 1954) with immigrant-augmented elastic 
labor supplies applied to late 19th century Latin America (Lewis 1978a), 
and many Latin American scholars subsequently agreed. Garios Diaz-
Alejandro (1970) wrote that the labor supply in Argentina before 1930 was 
«perfecdy elastic at the going wage (plus some differential) in the industrial 
centers of Italy and Spain». Nathaniel Leff (1992) thought the same was 
true of the Brazilian Southeast and that elastic immigrant labor supplies 
could account for stable wages in Sao Paulo and Santos from the 1880s 
onwards. If the elastic labor supply thesis is correct, then late 19th century 
Latin emigration should have been far more responsive to wage gaps between 
home and abroad compared with the early emigrants from northwest Europe 
going to North America, Australia and New Zealand. What seems like a 
plausible hypothesis has, however, been soundly rejected: Latin emigrants 
were no more responsive to wage gaps between home and abroad than 
was the case for other European emigrants (Hatton and Williamson 1994; 
1998). It is simply not true that the Latin economies in the late 19th century 
had more elastic emigrant labor supplies than the rest of Europe. This revi-
sionist finding is consistent with Alan Taylor's (1994) research which shows 
that Argentina's immigration was no more responsive to wage gaps than 
was Australia's. This new evidence does not imply that European migrants 
going to Latin America were unresponsive to wage gaps, but it does do 
heavy damage to the arguments of Sir Arthur Lewis (1978a) and Carlos 
Diaz-Alejandro (1970) that Latin American development took place under 
uniquely elastic labor supplies. They were not uniquely elastic. 
Without the wage gaps favoring the more labor scarce parts of Latin 
America, the Mediterranean migrants would never have come. And the 
labor scarce parts were certainly the ones which mattered. As Figure 9 
suggests, the Latin American wage advantage over the western and central 
Mediterranean (a population weighted average of Italy, Portugal and 
Spain )^ collapsed from the early 1890s to World War L In fact, by 1918 
' These weights seem appropriate given what we know about the origin of the 
foreign-bom in the major immigrating áreas of Latin America. Between 1891 and 1910, 
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FIGURE 9 
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there was very little real wage advantage that Argentina, Uruguay and Cuba 
had to offer potential emigrants from the westem and central Mediterra-
nean, and México had fallen way behind. There was a lively Latin America 
rebound in the 1920s and 1930s, but the high wage leaders —Cuba, México 
and the Southern Cone— never regained their late 19th century advantage. 
This is one reason why Latin American immigration fell off in the interwar 
decades. Another reason, of course, is that the immigrating countries adop-
ted less generous subsidies and in some cases outright hostñe policies 
towards the European emigrants. However, this policy switch in Latin Ame-
rica was in part driven by the erosión of relative labor scarcity, a rise in 
inequality, and a competitive response to U.S. quota restrictions, also driven 
by rising inequality there (Timmer and Williamson 1998). 
Italians and Spaniards made up about 85 percent of the total immigrants entering Argentina 
(Sánchez-Albornoz 1974, p. 160). Between 1819 and 1959, Portuguese, Italians and 
Spaniards made up almost three quarters of Brazilian immigration (Sánchez-Albornoz 1974, 
p. 161). And between 1902 and 1918, Spaniards made up almost 82 percent of Cuban 
immigrants (Sánchez-Albornoz 1974, p. 167). 
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Prior to 1914, the size of the gaps also had an important impact on 
where the immigrants went in Latin America. Table 1 and Figure 9 suggest 
the biggest iininigration rates should have been recorded by the Southern 
Cone, illustrated by Argentina and Uruguay. The next biggest rates should 
have been recorded by Cuba, followed by México, followed far behind 
by the others. The problem is that the comparative immigration data for 
Latin America isn't good enough to perform a strict test of what seems 
to be a plausible hypothesis. Yet, imperfect data in Table 6 confirm it. 
In the 1870s and 1880s, the immigration rates in Argentina were five to 
six times those of Brazil. Even if we assume that all the BraziUan immigrants 
went to the Southeast, the immigration rates into the Brazilian Southeast 
in the 1870s would still have been less than half that of Argentina ' . By 
the first decade of the present century, Argentina had the highest immi-
gration rates in the New World. Cuba was in second place, even higher 
than the United States. Brazil was in last place, one quarter of Cuba and 
one tenth of Argentina. As for the (poorly-documented) rest, Nicholas Sán-
chez-Albornoz (1974) reports that the Mexican census of 1900 recorded 
only 0.5 percent foreign-born, the Venezuelan share was only 4 percent 
in 1891, and even the Chilean share was only 4.7 percent in 1907. It 
certainly seems like «the tide of migration ... flowed only toward the most 
developed áreas» of Latin America (Sánchez-Albornoz 1974), and, it might 
be added, the tide also seemed to be deflected by the tyranny of distance. 
There is, of course, another way to explore this correlation. Did high 
wage regions in Latin America have higher rates of population and labor 
forcé growth than low wage regions? The immigrations from Europe would 
have helped yield that result, as we have seen. But the domestic population 
response should have reinforced the immigration response: the more labor 
scarce and high wage regions should have had economic conditions which 
encouraged couples to marry younger and to have more children, and the 
children should have been more likely to survive. Figure 10 confirms the 
hypothesis for the period 1850-1940: here the rate of population growth 
is regressed on the initial real wage; the estimated coefficient is 0.012, 
and the t-statistic is 2.22. Of course, the finding that high wages today 
encourages a positive labor supply response tomorrow does not necessarily 
imply a rejection of the Malthusian proposition that a swollen population 
today, with fixed resources, implies diminishing retums, declining real wages 
' The Brazilian Southeast share of total Brazilian population in 1872 was about 40 
percent (Leff 1972, p. 253). 
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TABLE5 
Real Wages in Latín America Relative to Argentina, 1830-1939 
(in percent) 
Period Brazil, Brazil, Colombia 
Southeast Northeast 
1865-1869 21.0 9.2 35.0 
1870-1874 20.2 7.2 26.2 
1875-1879 28.3 8.1 26.1 
1880-1884 25.1 5.9 24.2 
1885-1889 24.0 4.5 28.6 
1890-1894 19.1 3.8 29.3 
1895-1899 17.8 3.8 31.0 
1900-1904 19.5 5.3 — 
1905-1909 24.3 7.8 — 
1910-1914 23.2 7.4 24.6 
1915-1919 23.2 6.4 40.8 
1920-1924 14.4 3.7 33.9 
1925-1929 13.7 3.1 35.7 
1930-1934 16.1 2.2 51.8 
1935-1939 42.0 
SouRCES: Williamson (1998c), Appendix Table 7.1. 
































and living standards tomorrow. I will come back to this issue at the end, 
of this section. 
Thus, the fact that labor supplies to Argentina and Brazil were not 
perfectly or even uniquely elastic did not imply that the immigrations were 
small or that they failed to have an impact on population and labor forcé 
growth. However, there are other reasons why the migrations to the Sout-
hern Cone, at least, were mass. A boom in the natural rate of population 
increase two decades earlier was a very powerful forcé serving to push 
up emigration rates in Italy and Portugal, experience on the upswing of 
the demographic transition that was replicated in the rest of Europe earlier 
in the century. While there was still a wage gap favoring the Southern 
Cone two to one, these demographic events were by far the most powerful 
forces accounting for the surge in Italian and Portuguese emigration rates 
after the 1880s. Spain, however, is an exception: rates of natural increase 
were falling in the 1870s and ISBOs, not rising (Moreda 1987). If emi-
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FIGURE 10 
The Long-Run Labor Supply Response: Correlation Between the Initial 
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grant-inducing demographic forces were absent in Spain after the 1880s, 
why the rise in Spanish emigration rates? The answer seems to lie largely 
with economic failure at home. The wage gap between Spain and des-
tination countries remained enormous: the ratio of Argentine to Spanish 
real wages was 2.3 in 1885, 3.1 in 1895, 3.6 in 1905 and 2.5 in 1913. 
This fact explains almost all of the surge in Spanish emigration. The same 
was true of Portugal, although the failure at home was not nearly as great. 
In contrast, Italian wages were catching up with those in destination coun-
tries —^Argentina, Germany and the United States— and that wage success 
muted the surge in Italian emigration by partially offsetting those powerful 
emigrant-inducing demographic forces. 
For all three Latin countries, there were additional underlying fun-
damentáis that they shared and which served to contribute to the surge 
in emigration: modest rates of industrialization (e.g., slow rates of «good» 
Job creation) and rising migrant populations abroad which sent remittances 
home. Nonetheless, what really made the Latin countries in the Medi-
terranean different after the 1880s was the delayed demographic transition 
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and the economic failure in Portugal and Spain. Furthermore, Blanca Sán-
chez-Alonso (1998; 1999 forthcoming) has stressed the role that policy 
played in creating an even poorer emigration environment in Spain. While 
the rest of the world stuck with the gold standard, Spain depreciated the 
peseta (and raised tariffs on cereals) so that Spanish agriculture could com-
pete with foreign imports in the domestic market. This policy served to 
raise the demand for unskilled labor at home and to reduce emigration 
push, but it also made the cost of the move overseas more expensive. 
So, it was not elastic labor supply responses to wage gaps that produced 
the mass migrations from the western and central Mediterranean to Argen-
tina, Chile, Uruguay and the Brazilian Southeast. Rather, it was demo-
graphic events and economic failure in the Mediterranean. And these mass 
migrations mattered, just as they did in so many other parts of the Atlantic 
Economy. The poorest European countries tended to have the highest emi-
gration rates, the richest new world countries tended to have the highest 
immigration rates, while the European industrial leaders and the poorest 
new world laggards both tended to lie in the middle with net migration 
cióse to zero. Where we can measure it, big migrations translated into 
big labor forcé impact in both sending and receiving regions (Taylor and 
Wüliamson 1997; O'Rourke and Williamson 1997; Williamson 1998d): 
mass migration after 1870 served to augment the 1910 combined new 
world labor forcé in Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canadá, and the United 
States by an enormous 49 percent, to reduce the 1910 labor forcé in the 
emigrant countries around the poor European periphery (including Iberia 
and Italy) by a very large 22 percent, and, where the net migrations were 
much more modest, to reduce the 1910 labor forcé in the European indus-
trial core by tiny 2 percent. Mass migration by itself probably explained 
from 50 to 70 percent of the real wage convergence in the late 19th century 
Atlantic economy (Taylor and Williamson 1997; O'Rourke and Williamson 
1999). 
This late 19th century Atlantic economy sample just discussed includes 
Argentina and Brazil, but no other Latin American countries. What role 
did mass migration play elsewhere in Latin America? Since we have already 
seen that the migration data is poor for the rest of Latin America, we 
will have to make do with cruder population data. While Figure 10 and 
Table 6 confirmed that rich Latin American countries had the highest rates 
of immigration and population growth, we now ask a different question: 
Did immigration and population growth tend to erode the wage advantage 
in the more labor scarce Latin American economies? To get an answer. 
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TABLEÓ 
New World Inmigration Rates by Decade 
(per 100 mean populatíon) 
Country 1851-60 1861-70 1871-80 1881-90 1891-00 1901-10 
Latin America 
Argentina 38.5 99.1 117.0 221.7 163.9 291.8 
Brazil 20.4 41.1 72.3 33.8 
Cuba 118.4 
Other New World 
Australia 122.2 100.4 146.9 7.3 9.9 
Canadá 99.2 83.2 54.8 78.4 48.8 167.6 
United States 92.8 64.9 54.6 85.8 53.0 102.0 
SOURCE: Hatton and Williamson (1998: Table 2.2) based on Ferenczi and Willcox (1929: 
209); Taylor (1992: Appendix Table 1.A2). 
we borrow from the new empirical growth theory and regress per annum 
real wage growth on the real wage at the start of the period (giving peor 
countries the chance to exhibit «catch-up» on the rich), the rate of popu-
lation growth (giving diminishing retums a chance to exhibit its effects), 
and a dummy for the pre-1919 versus the post-1918 years (giving the boom 
and bust in the world economy a chance to have its influence on growth 
performance in Latin America). The results for 1850-1940 suggest that 
the determinants of Latin American growth prior to World War 11 were 
far too complex to be captured very effectively by this simple model (es-
timated coefficient, with t-statistics in parentheses): 
initial real wage - 0.015 (0.918) 
dummy = 1 if<1919 +2.974 (3.165) 
population growth +1.790 (2.895) 
First, there is no evidence of catching up within Latin America —the 
sign is right on the initial real wage, but the t-statistic too low— a finding 
that repeats what we reported earlier in this essay. Second, the coefficient 
on the dummy variable confirms that growth was far faster before 1919 
than after, a result which is certainly consistent with positive price shocks 
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favoring Latin America during the first great globalization boom. Third, 
there appears to be absolutely no evidence of diminishing returns since 
the signifícant coefficient on population growth is positive, not negative. 
However, it should be pointed out that we really need information on 
the rate of labor forcé growth (missing from the Latin American 19th cen-
tury data base), not population growth. After all, Latin American countries 
with fast rates of population growth also had big immigration rates. Since 
immigrants were mostly young adults, rapid population growth meant a 
rise in the labor participation rate, and this may have favored economic 
growth (Bloom and Williamson 1998; Williamson 1998d). 
WAGE-RENTAL RATIOS AND INEQUALITY TRENDS 
IN THE SOUTHERN CONE 
Eli Heckscher and Bertil Ohlin argued that the integration of global 
commodity markets would lead to convergence of international factor pri-
ces, as countries everywhere expanded the production and export of com-
modities which used their abundant (and cheap) factor intensively. The 
only historical evidence for Latin America that I am aware of, wage-rental 
ratio trends from Argentina (O'Rourke, Taylor and Williamson 1996) and 
from Uruguay (Bertola et al. 1999), seems to be consistent with Heckscher 
and Ohlin. They appear in Table 7. 
The trade boom between the 1870s and World War I led to falling 
wage-rental ratios in relatively land-abundant Argentina and Uruguay, just 
as Heckscher and Ohlin would have predicted. As the exports of land-in-
tensive products boomed, so did the demand for land and thus rents. 
As the imports of labor-intensive manufactured products also boomed, the 
demand for labor fell, at least relative to land, and thus so did the wage-ren-
tal or the wage-land-value ratio. Where 1913 = 1.0, the wage-rental (or 
the wage-land-value) ratio plunged from about 6.9 to about 0.6 between 
1880-1884 and 1915-1919 in Argentina, and from 11.1 to 1.2 between 
1870-1874 and 1915-1919 in Uruguay. Altematively, the ratio of land rents 
to wages soared by about ten times over these four or five decades. This 
is a huge change in the relative scarcity of land and labor. As it turns 
out, these trends were typical everywhere in the land-abundant periphery, 
like Australia and North America (O'Rourke, Taylor and Williamson 1996) 
or Thailand or the Punjab (Williamson 1998a), where the possibility of 
trade with the core was being exploited. Exactly the opposite trends were 
130 
REAL WAGES, INEQUALITY AND GLOBALIZATION IN LATÍN AMERICA BEFORE 1940 
TABLE7 
Argentine and Uruguay Wage/Land-Value Trends 1870 
(1913 = 1.0) 
Period Argentina Uruguay 
W/Und Valué W/Und Valué 
1870-1874 11.1248 
1875-1879 8.9130 
1880-1884 6.9115 7.2825 
1885-1889 4.0139 4.0021 
1890-1894 4.3427 3.7719 
1895-1899 3.7043 3.0361 
1900-1904 3.4503 2.3299 
1905-1909 1.6100 1.6777 
1910-1914 1.0001 1.1788 
1915-1919 0.6379 1.2083 
1920-1924 0.6324 1.5026 
1925-1929 0.6072 1.5018 
1930-1934 0.6951 1.7434 
1935-1939 0.7089 2.1353 
SouRCES: The series for Argentina is from Williamson (1998c), 
Appendix Table 1.4. The series for Uruguay is from Bértola et al. 
(1999). 
taking place in Europe, especially in those parts of Europe which stuck 
to their free trade guns: i.e., wage-rental ratios soared in Britain, Ireland 
and Scandinavia. To the extent that land holdings were highiy concentrated 
at the top, these trends clearly implied rising inequality in Argentina and 
Uruguay, but falling inequality in Europe. Furthermore, when the world 
economy fell apart after World War I, the steep decline in the wage-rental 
ratio stopped in Argentina and Uruguay and actually began to rise in the 
193Os (Table 7). Presumably, inequality trends reversed as well. 
So much for factor demand and globalization. What about factor 
supply? As we pointed out above, W. Arthur Lewis (1954) used his famous 
labor surplus model to show how early industriaÜzation could créate ine-
quality (and also a rising surplus to finance domestic-savings-constrained 
accumulation). Stable real wages implied rising profit shares economy-wide. 
According to his model, the worker fails to share in GDP per capita growth 
since elastic labor supplies keep wages and living standards stable. The 
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Lewis model is quiet about what happens to land rents, but the classical 
mcxlel from which it was derived clearly predicted a rise. As we have seen, 
Diaz-Alejandro (1970), on Argentina, and Leff (1972; 1992), on Brazil, 
both have used the labor surplus model to predict stable real wages in 
Latín America, appealing to the migration of surplus labor from the Medi-
terranean. While the thesis that these parts of Latin America had more 
elastic labor supplies is rejected, they did have higher rates of immigration 
and labor forcé growth. This process of intensification may have suppressed 
real wage growth relative to other factor pnces like land rents. After all, 
and in spite of land settlement, labor supplies were more elastic than land 
supplies, and land/labor ratios fell in the Southern Cone. Meanwhile, rising 
export prices raised land rents and land valúes. Note also that the fact 
that mass migrations into Argentina and Uruguay dropped off sharply after 
World War I is consistent with the turn-around in the wage-rental ratio 
drift in Table 7. 
It follows that the Heckscher-Ohlin globalization model and the Lewis 
labor-surplus model both predict falling wage-rental ratios and rising ine-
quality in the globalizing Southern Cone prior to World War I, and the 
opposite thereafter. Thus, discriminating empirically between these two 
competing views will prove difficult since both were at work. Regardless 
of which thesis explains Southern Cone history best, we need to know 
whether this experience was ubiquitous across Latin America. 
fflNTS AND HUNCHES ABOUT INEQUALITY TRENOS 
IN LATÍN AMERICA 
Complete income distributions at various benchmarks between the 
mid-19th century and World War 11 are unavailable for any Latin American 
country, including Argentina and Uruguay. But even if such data were 
available, it is not obvious that they would offer the best way to search 
for the underlying causes of changing inequality. Our interest here is factor 
prices: wages, land rents and premium on skills. How did the typical uns-
killed worker near the bottom of the distribution do relative to the typical 
landowner or capitalist near the top, or even relative to the typical sldlled 
blue collar worker or educated white collar employee near the middle? 
The modem debate over OECD inequality has a fixation on wages, but 
since land and landed interests were far more important to late 19th century 
inequality trends —especially in the more agradan Latin America— we 
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need to add them to our distribution inquiry. In any case, there are two 
kinds of evidence available to document inequality trends in Latín America 
prior to 1940: trends in the wage-rental ratio, which we have already explo-
red, but, sad to say, are limited to Argentina and Uruguay; and trends 
in the ratio of the unskilled wage to GDP per capita, which we have not 
yet explored, and which are available for seven Latin American regions 
between 1870 and 1940. 
Table 8 reports trends in the ratio of the unskilled worker's wage (w) 
to the returns on aü factors per person as measured by Maddison's (1995) 
and Astorga and FitzGerald's (1998) estimates of GDP per capita (y). True, 
the ratio could be influenced by changes in the labor participation rate 
alone. If there was a sharp increase in population from, say, a rise in fertility 
and thus no increase in workers of adult age, w/y would (spuriously) rise. 
That is, nothing would happen to the wage or to GDP, but GDP per 
capita would fall. In contrast, if there was a sharp increase in population 
from the immigration of adult labor, w/y would fall, since the adult immi-
grants would tend to lower wages but increase per capita income as labor 
participation rates rose. Thus, the pre-WWI immigration into the Southern 
Cone and Cuba —^where immigration rates were big— probably tends to 
make falling w/y trends overstate rising inequality there. Still, trends in 
w/y should approximate changes in the economic distance between the 
working poor near the bottom of the distribution and the average citizen 
in the middle of the distribution ^^. 
Table 8 shows that any successful explanation of inequality changes 
in Latin America between 1870 and 1940 will have to be complex: the 
Heckscher-OhÜn trade model and the Lewis labor surplus model will not, 
by themselves, account for all the variety. Argentina, México and Uruguay 
document the longest time series, and Table 8 shows that they share the 
same trends. They all underwent a long, steep decline in w/y before it 
flattened out or even rose after World War I The tuming point for all 
three is 1915-1919, a result consistent with wage-rental ratio trends in 
Table 7 documented for Argentina and Uruguay. Although its time series 
is shorter, Cuba seemed to obey the same laws of motion and the same 
tuming point. Colombia's time series is even shorter than Cuba's, so we 
do not know whether 1910-1914 was a tuming point for Colombia or 
not. The only evidence in Table 8 inconsistent with either the Hecks-
'" It tums out that this statistic is highly correlated with more comprehensive inequality 
measures in the few cases where both are available in the Atlantic economy. See Williamson 
(1998d,Table5). 
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TABLE8 
Wage/GDPPer Capita Ratio Trends, 1870-1939 
(1913 = 1.00) 




1880-1884 1.4769 1.1881 1.9047 
1885-1889 1.5663 1.0899 2.2004 
1890-1894 1.5191 1.0387 2.2555 
1895-1899 1.4428 1.0503 1.6946 
1900-1904 1.4570 1.2209 1.5325 0.9702 1.3658 
1905-1909 1.0500 1.1529 1.4431 1.2108 0.8633 1.0966 
1910-1914 1.0433 1.0318 1.1451 1.3317 0.9924 0.7738 1.0759 
1915-1919 0.9230 0.7899 0.6751 1.5811 0.9329 0.2982 0.8981 
1920-1924 1.1298 0.6280 0.5383 1.9191 1.2210 0.3615 1.1346 
1925-1929 1.2440 0.5912 0.5361 2.2206 1.4785 0.4613 1.1785 
1930-1934 1.4144 0.5760 0.3652 3.0818 1.5704 0.6903 1.4745 
1935-1939 1.3032 2.0995 1.4853 0.5129 1.2918 
SouRCES: GDP per capita data for Argentina, Colombia, and México are from Maddison 
(1995), while the information for Cuba is from Astorga and FitzGerald (1998). Income 
per capita estimates for the regions of Brazil are from Gomes (1986). Note that even though 
the PPP-adjustment benchmarks were based only on Astorga and FitzGerald, we have used 
the Maddison source of GDP per capita data here as it extends coverage for more years. 
(Astorga and FitzGerald offer only decadal coverage.) These GDP per capita figures were 
interpolated where necessary and rebased so that 1913= 100. The real wage data are from 
Williamson (1998c), Appendix Tables 1-6. 
cher-Ohlin or the Lewis explanations is Brazil, which underwent a steady 
decline in w/y from the tum of the century onwards. The behavior of 
this inequality proxy can be best summarized for all of Latin America by 
pooling the annual data underiying the fíve-year averages in Table 8. The 
results of a non-linear regression are plotted in Figure 11 '^, and the pre-
dicted time when w/y reached a mínimum is 1918-1919. 
" The ratio w/y is regressed on time (coef = —1.355, t-stat = 3.955) and time-squared 
(coef= -t-0.0004, t-stat = 3.934), and the predicted mínimum is 1918.8. November 11, the 
day of the official Germán surrender, was pretty cióse to 80 percent of the way through 
1918. 
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FIGURE 11 
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Why did the real wage lag behind GDP per capita in so much of Latin 
America during the first great globalization boom? Is this evidence of some 
weaker versión of the Lewis model, one without a constant real wage but 
\vith sluggish real wage growth and modest trickling down? Is it evidence 
supporting the factor-price convergence theorem? Or is it both? And why 
the common turning point for economies with such different attributes? 
Since it seems unlikely that such dissimilar economies could share the same 
Lewis labor supply turning point (unless immigration was doing all the 
work), perhaps a more likely explanation lies with world markets. These 
countries were more likely to have shared similar pnce shocks which pro-
duced the same trends in w/y. 
We have found an important Latin American stylized fact. Real wages 
lagged behind GDP per capita growth everywhere in Latin America up 
to the World War I decade. Real wages outstripped GDP per capita growth 
everywhere in Latin America thereafter. We interpret these trends as a 
proxy for rising inequality during the first great globalization boom and 
falling inequality during the interwar years. What accounts for this stylized 
fact? This paper will duck this question, adding it to that lengthening agen-
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TABLE9 
Regional Real Wage Índices for Brazil, 1833-193^ 
(SE-Southeasi; NE-Northeast) 

















SouRCES AND NoTES: The real wage series used for the 
calculations were PPP-adjusted. See Williamson (1998c), 
Appendix Table 7.2. 
da, but it should be noted that the same stylized fact appears in Asia 
(Williamson 1998a, 1999a forthcoming) and the eastem Mediterranean 
(Williamson 1998b, 1999b forthcoming). 
AN AGENDA 
This real wage data base has served us well in generating a research 
agenda for the economic performance of Latin America over the century 
before 1940. By focusing on relative growth performance within Latin Ame-
rica, rather than between Latin America and the European OECD or the 
United States, two stylized facts have emerged that need explanations. 
Across the 20th centviry, Latin America has undergone dramatic conver-
gence: living standards in poor countries have been catching up with those 
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in rich. How much of this has been due to economic failure among the 
rich, and how much to economic success among the poor? And why did 
all of the convergence take place in two discrete steps, 1910-1930 and 
1970-1990? Do these two periods have enough in common to offer a com-
mon explanation for both? The 19th century was different: living standard 
gaps between rich and poor parts of Latin America widened up to the 
1890s, whiie they narrowed thereafter. What accounts for the inverted-U? 
Any effort to confront these two stylized facts must augment the quality 
and coverage of those explanatory variables which have had success more 
generally in the new growth literature. In particular, any agenda whose 
goal it is to isolate the role of policy in accounting for these trends, needs 
to control for demography, the luck of the draw in world commodity mar-
kets, the breakdown of the tyranny of distance, the rise and fall of integrated 
world factor markets, and other forces. 
Trends in the wage-rental ratio and in the wage/GDP-per-capüa ratio 
have produced a third stylized fact. Both of these ratios trend steeply down-
wards to World War I, then trend upwards immediately thereafter. Why? 
Since both of these measures are proxies for inequality, they take on even 
greater importance. So, what accounts for this stylized fact, a fact that 
has been recently discovered in Asia and the Mediterranean too? Is it 
the consequence of the Heckscher-Ohlin model? If so, is it price shocks 
doing the work? Or, is it instead changes in attitudes towards globalization, 
open prior to World War I and closed thereafter? If it is price shocks, 
how much of it is attributable to the fundamentáis underlying «world» 
terms of trade changes, and how much to changing transport costs and 
policy? Altematively, was factor accumulation doing the work, heavy immi-
gration of capital and labor combining with less elastic land supplies prior 
to World War I, while the opposite thereafter? In short, was it commodity 
markets or factor markets which accounted for that inequality tuming 
point? Or was it something else? 
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research assistance of Davin Chor, Ximena Clark, Graciela Márquez, 
Rebecca Rissman and Matt Weinzierl, all of whom have been involved 
at various points since 1995 when this project started. The prices, wages 
and rent data underlying this paper can be found in «Real Wages and 
Relative Factor Prices in the Third World: Latin America», HIER Discussion 
Paper 1853, Department of Economics, Harvard University (November 
1998), referred to in the text as Williamson (1998c). This paper can also 
be found at my website under www.economics.harvard. However, that 
data base is being revised extensively (spring 1999) and the revisions can 
be obtained by contacting the author at his email address jwilliam@kuz-
nets.fas.harvard.edu. Williamson (1998c) has two HIER Discussion Paper 
companions: «Real Wages and Relative Factor Prices in the Third World 
1820-1940: Asia» [1998a] and «Real Wages and Relative Factor Prices 
in the Third World 1820-1940: The Mediterranean Basin» [1998b] which 
are also available upon request. The data from Asia and the Mediterranean, 
and the two papers themselves, can also be downloaded from my web 
site, but the underlying data is also being revised and augmented extensively 
(spring 1999). 
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